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his essay addresses aspects of the cultural traditions 
and practices of Russian Orthodox believers and bear-
ers of that church’s legacy in contemporary society, 
especially in the gray area between the secular and 
religious spheres of life. The theoretical basis of the present study 
is rooted in Jürgen Habermas’s understanding of the “post-sec-
ular”, by which is meant the regaining of religion by individuals 
and societies. Habermas proposes a new “third way” for a social 
contract, one that requires an equal dialog between religious and 
secular citizens.1 My aim here is to elaborate on the improvement 
of the relationship among the church, the state, and society in the 
contemporary Russian situation by comparing it with the West, 
where secularization has been seen as a key component of mod-
ernization. I call for a dialog between the Western social theory 
of civil religion and Russian statements on its own cultural tradi-
tion. The guiding research question is: to what extent are cultural 
traditions — such as the shared value of symphony,2 or practicing 
forms of theosis and collective, circular control (as discussed by 
Oleg Kharkhordin3) — still at the core of self-identification and 
ingroup communication in Russian cultural Orthodoxy? My hy-
pothesis is that such cultural traditions and practices are crucial, 
and therefore they should be openly integrated into societal 
dialog and form the key components of Russia’s unique model of 
civil religion. I also posit that, due to Russia’s Orthodox legacy, 
its potential for civil religion is fundamentally different from the 
Western (here: American) model, and therefore should be ana-
lyzed in its own, non-Western context. What is vital is that Rus-
sian political tradition emphasizes symphony between secular 
and sacred authority, and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), 
by virtue of its history and as the religion of the ethnic majority, 
has dominated other confessions. As a result, cultural and politi-
cal Orthodoxy formed the modus vivendi that in the public sphere 
of symbols, legislation, and practices, ruled not just over its own 
adherents but over non-Orthodox, non-Russians, and non-be-
lievers as well. By inertia, the ROC and the Kremlin today aspire 
to revive the prerevolutionary tradition of symphony, while si-
multaneously admitting the multiconfessional and secular status 
of the state. Given this controversy, it is safe to posit that a better 
analysis of the Russian model of civil religion is urgently needed — 
even more so today, when the conflict in Ukraine is drawing  two 
Orthodox nations into fratricide.
TODAY, A SELF-IDENTIFICATION with the spiritual and historical leg-
acy of Russian Orthodoxy unites the majority of ethnic Russians 
and/or Russian speakers.4 Adherence to “cultural Orthodoxy” 
is to some extent also shared by non-Orthodox citizens, due to 
its ubiquity and intangibility, which helped it to transform and 
survive 70 years of communism. Because of this combination of 
shared tradition, ubiquity, and intangibility, it seems that prac-
tices of symphony, theosis, and circular control apply to both 
the Orthodox Christian (pravoslavnye) and the non-Orthodox 
(inovernye, inoslavnye) citizens, and even those rossiiane living 
abroad in “Greater Russia”5. My point is that the ubiquity of cul-
tural Orthodoxy lies in the fact that it relates deeply to the public 
sphere and therefore creates a potential realm for agency and 
choices, and ultimately for an updated contract between church 
and state and between church and civil society. Due to its ubiq-
uity, it forms an organic part of political culture as well. Accord-
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ing to White6, the USSR incorporated eight features of Russian 
tradition that characterize political culture: low public participa-
tion in politics, and hence the weak articulation of representative 
institutions; authoritarianism and an unusually broad scope of 
government; personalization of the population’s political attach-
ments; centralization; bureaucracy; a strong sense of commu-
nity; suspicion towards outsiders; and a reliance on face-to-face 
relations rather than anonymous procedures.7 I would agree with 
White and Richters and stress that these features are still preva-
lent today.
It is generally held that, even though personal attendance at 
worship is low and even though the ROC is widely criticized for 
its corruption, authoritarianism, and conspicuous compromises 
with secular authority and nationalist groupings, Orthodox iden-
tity and the ROC as its promoter have made a permanent come-
back in modernizing society, for both good and ill.8 The public 
duumvirate of secular and ecclesiastical authority, referred to as 
“symphony”, simfoniia, has taken a stronger hold on daily life 
(Channel 1 broadcasts on Russian TV offer sufficient evidence). 
The ROC has regained much of its property and privilege; it acts 
as a supra-national body in “Greater Russia” (including Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Estonia) and is a viable soft power player once more. 
The church enjoys trust. It is seen as the upholder of national 
values. Whether it is because of a post-Soviet backlash, or inertia, 
or the authorities’ efforts to maintain social cohesion inside Rus-
sia and in “Greater Russia” or to resist anti-Western tendencies, 
the fact is that the presence of cultural and political Orthodoxy, 
with all of its practices, has strengthened. Yet cultural Orthodoxy 
as a set of beliefs and practices is still insufficiently studied in 
its contemporary forms, and its potential as a positive force in 
modernizing Russian society and in the global environment is 
understated.
IN THIS ESSAY I revisit Robert N. Bellah’s classic work “Civil Reli-
gion in America” (1967) and his subsequent “Religion and the Le-
gitimation of the American Republic” (1980). In these works, Bel-
lah discusses the contract between secular and religious author-
ity. My aim is to point out the similarities and differences between 
the American contract, as analyzed by Bellah, and the emerging 
Russian one, although I also argue that there exists just now a 
momentum towards formulating a new kind of contract of civil 
religion in Russia. Specific traits of this situation should be exam-
ined, since together they may represent threats or opportunities, 
inertia or open choices for a modus vivendi. “Russian cultural Or-
thodoxy” denotes here not only the ROC as a formal hierarchical 
organization, but also lay networks, brotherhoods, monasteries 
and foundations, and even informal and untraditional civil agen-
cies such as the pro-Putin musical group Buranovo Babushkas 
and the anti-Putin group Pussy Riot.
The Russian Orthodox Church and  
the challenge of modernization
In light of the ROC’s incapacity to deal with any civil protest, it 
seems that there is an evident need for a revised contract be-
tween the secular and religious authorities over their societal 
roles. Renegotiating a new civil religion contract would allow 
Russia to avoid antagonistic situations in which accusations of 
“blasphemy” are treated in secular courtrooms as “hooliganism” 
Today, a self-identifi-
cation with the spiritual 
and historical legacy 
of Russian Orthodoxy 
unites the majority of 
ethnic Russians and/or 
Russian speakers. 
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or as a “crime against the state”, as in the scandalous Pussy Riot 
trial.9 That trial exposed, more than any other example, the un-
preparedness of the ROC or the state to deal with the antagonistic 
sphere between the Orthodox authority and the modern, a priori 
secular civil agency whose openness and globalism are evident in 
social media.10 It is worth noting that without social media, espe-
cially YouTube, no scandal would ever have taken place. Howev-
er, social media are not only a threat but also an opportunity: the 
Pussy Riot case also pointed to potential affirmative agency by 
revealing taboos that cannot be dealt with in formal institutions.11
Given the huge challenges, self-reflection is a must. It is crucial 
that the ROC, within the frame of its specific traditions and his-
toric trajectory, takes up the challenge of self-reflection posed by 
post-secularity, and accepts the existence of competing denomi-
nations, the autonomy of secular knowledge from sacred knowl-
edge, and the institutionalized monopoly of modern scientific 
expertise. Meanwhile, the ROC needs to develop an epistemic 
stance regarding the secular reasoning predominant in political 
arena.12
AS FOR DEMOCRATIC values held among Orthodox adherents, 
Christopher Marsh has claimed that “religious belief and practice 
have virtually no impact on democratic values, suggesting that 
Orthodoxy may not be the obstacle to democracy that some have 
made it out to be.”13 More recently, Irina Papkova’s analysis of 
the mass campaign against electronic identification pointed out 
that within the formal ROC structures there are fractions of liber-
als, traditionalists, and fundamentalists.14 And finally, Kristina 
Stoeckl’s15 analysis of the Social Doctrine and the Human Rights 
Doctrine debate has shown that modernization of the ROC is 
truly in progress:
The ROC recognizes that modern society has become 
the natural living environment for the majority of Ortho-
dox believers, and while the ROC criticizes the excesses 
of modern society it also responds to the legitimate 
desire of the Orthodox believer to be part of that society. 
... I would argue that the changes in the human rights 
debate actually stand for an ideological renewal, and not 
only for strategic-political adaptation16.
With this in mind, one would conclude that Orthodox faith and 
practice in Russia are not per se obstacles to the country’s demo-
cratic development. If peace prevails, openness will grow and 
human rights debates will gradually contribute to an ideological 
renewal. On a closer look, the ROC is neither a monolith nor a 
remnant of an idealized past, but consists of a wide range of cler-
ical-formal and lay actors whose choices will contribute to the 
content of the contract between secular and religious authority, 
even if the dogma of symphony remains untouched.17
American ‘civil religion’ and Russian 
Orthodox tradition
As was argued earlier, modern Western social theory has so far 
failed to take Russian traditions of the sociology of religion into 
serious consideration when discussing Russian social develop-
ment. What we need is better and more egalitarian integration of 
Western and Russian academics’ work. To attempt a step forward 
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 Left: Russian Orthodox believers attend an Easter service in the 
Christ the Savior Cathedral in Moscow on April 24, 2011.  
Above: Members of the anti-Putin band Pussy Riot. 
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along this path, let us next compare the concept of civil religion 
proposed by the American sociologist Robert N. Bellah with some 
remarks on the situation in Russia. In his original essay “Civil Reli-
gion in America” (1967) — written during the crisis of the Vietnam 
War — Bellah was inspired by Jean Jacques Rousseau’s Social Con-
tract (1762). Rousseau outlined four simple dogmas of civil reli-
gion: “the existence of God, the life to come, the reward of virtue 
and the punishment of vice, and the exclusion of religious intol-
erance. All other religious opinions are outside the cognizance of 
the state and may be freely held by citizens.”18 Rousseau’s dogma 
is still valid. In addition, the Durkheimian emphasis that civil 
religion is an “objective social fact”, a sine qua non, is important 
here.19 Comparing Bellah’s theory with the historical trajectory 
and recent developments of post-secular Russia leads us to focus 
on the following points:
 Civil religion deals with ultimate questions of faith and power. 
Sovereignty rests with the people, but ultimate sovereignty has 
been attributed to God. Civil religion deals with tensions between 
secular and religious authorities and the legitimacy of political 
authority. This definition is universal, but manifests itself differ-
ently in different historical and national civil religions.20 
In Russia, the historical trajectory, the question of faith and 
power is exhibited in the narrative of statehood. The birth of the 
state is associated with Vladimir I’s baptism and the Christianiza-
tion of Kievan Rus in 988. The ROC backed the political authority 
until 1917 in the name of symphony; Russian ethnicity meant 
adherence to Orthodoxy. In the officially atheistic USSR, the ROC 
was involved when its help was needed, as during WWII. In post-
Soviet Russia, symphony has been revitalized, especially during 
Putin’s second term. The ROC plays a dominant role in an unusu-
ally broad range of government functions (the soft power agenda, 
military and penalty institutions), while the other traditional re-
ligions Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism are far less privileged; and 
some confessions such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses are considered 
outgroups.
CIVIL RELIGION PROVIDES different solutions to the religious—politi-
cal problem that seem to correlate with phases of religious evolu-
tion. In archaic societies, the focus of both political and religious 
attention was on a single figure, often identified as a divine king. 
Although in the first millennium B.C. this fusion between politi-
cal and religious power was broken by the emergence of the 
historic religions, “it remains a permanent possibility in human 
history”. Once the historic religions arise, there can be a direct 
relation to the divine, unmediated by political authority. This 
means a radical reorientation in the divine-kingship symbolism. 
“The symbolisms of Confucius or Jesus suggest ( Jesus’ throne is a 
cross and his crown is thorns) that the relations between political 
authority and ultimate meaning turn out more problematic than 
ever thought before”.21
In Russia, sovereign Orthodox Tsars anointed by God purport-
edly mediate between God and the faithful. Today, due to the 
memory of regicide in 1918, the aspect of national redemption is 
felt and strongly propagated, and is a part of political technology. 
It is key that Tsar Nicholas II (along with his family) was canon-
ized as a passion-bearer in 2000. Recently, the 400th anniversary 
of the Romanov dynasty has been widely celebrated in both secu-
lar and religious terms. Allusions to President Putin acting as a 
contemporary suverennyi come to mind. In festivities, films, cer-
emonial exhibitions, and the reconstruction of memorial places 
related to the Romanov dynasty (such as the village of Feodorov 
at Tsarskoe Selo), Orthodox Russia is seen as having God’s bless-
ing from past to present and future, whereas negative aspects of 
the Romanovs’ reign (or of Stalin’s) are taboo and not discussed 
in public.
CIVIL RELIGION EXISTS alongside, and is clearly differentiated from, 
churches. Adherents of different religious views are equally quali-
fied participants of political processes. The religious authorities 
recognize the legitimacy of the state in return for political recog-
nition of their own dominant position in the realm of religion.22
In Russia, another historical path was taken: centralism and 
the idea of symphony persist, implying that the ruler of the state 
is Orthodox and the Moscow Patriarchate’s position is dominant; 
a national redemption process focuses on the sin of regicide; 
legitimacy and power struggles continue. However, due to the 
low numbers of people joining the church (votserkovlenie) and 
strong propaganda and catechization via cultural Orthodoxy, 
the distinction between Orthodox and non-Orthodox adherents 
is blurred and gradual, especially in “Greater Russia”, where 
Eastern Orthodox civilization is the focus. Non-Orthodox citizens 
have formal access to political processes.
Civil religion shifts over time through “trials”. In America, 
the Declaration of Independence and the abolition of slavery are 
examples of such trials, whereas the Vietnam War, an acute crisis 
in 1967 when Bellah’s essay was written, is regarded as a Mani-
chean confrontation between East and West, where “honor is at 
stake”.23
In Russia, emancipation from the Mongol yoke, World War II, 
the wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and even the battle for 
hegemony over Crimea may represent analogous “trials”. Today, 
the ROC pointedly propagates the restrengthening of lost links 
between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, “in order to make 
peace flourish in the minds and hearts of brothers and sisters in 
blood and faith”.24 Richters has pointed out that in Ukraine, hard-
line MP clerics speak positively about the division of Ukraine and 
the integration of its eastern parts into Russia.25 In military train-
ing, Russian soldiers are taught to sacrifice their lives as a way of 
imitating Christ’s ultimate sacrifice, hence a form of theosis.26
Civil religion is messianic: one’s own nation is regarded as cho-
sen by God and a light unto all nations, one’s own country as the 
New Jerusalem; it is eschatological and ultimately transnational. 
“A world civil religion could be accepted as a fulfillment and not a 
denial of American civil religion”.27
In Russia, the manifestation of messianism is analogical, most 
famously elaborated by Slavophiles and Fyodor Dostoevsky, 
and today by neo-Eurasianists such as A. Dugin, an influential 
advisor to President Putin. Patriarch Kirill constantly stresses 
the heritage of Holy Rus and the unity of the great Eastern-Slavic 
civilization into which brethren in blood and faith are called. In 
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the Patriarch’s policies, Ukraine is important for 
its size and history, Kiev being the “mother of 
all Russian cities” and symbol of national bap-
tism. Today, clerics’ support for the  integration 
of Eastern Ukraine into Russia (vozvraschenie 
v Rossiiu/v Rodinu — return to Russia or to the 
homeland) bears some messianic features.
Civil religion can be researched through its 
Biblical archetypes: Exodus, the Chosen People, 
the Promised Land, the New Jerusalem, sac-
rificial death, and rebirth.28 Consequently, an 
examination of a nation’s model of civil religion 
addresses its own prophets and martyrs, its 
solemn rituals and symbols, as well as cultural 
patterns and practices.
In Russia the model is fairly similar. The 
distinction between ingroup and outgroup is 
important. Today, memorial dates related to na-
tional sacrifices, secular and religious martyrs, and redemption 
show the momentum of civil religion in the public sphere. The 
Piskaryovka, Levashovo, and Solovetsk memorials, for example, 
stress the universal, multiconfessional and multi-ethnic charac-
ter of mourning.
WE CAN CONCLUDE that there are both fundamental differences (a 
different history, the dominant position of the ROC, and the ubiq-
uity of cultural Orthodoxy in Russia versus American pluralism 
and modernism), but also similarities (strong momentum for re-
surgence through sacrifice; messianism) between Bellah’s model 
and the Russian model of civil religion. Next, let us examine in 
more detail the Orthodox model’s key concept symphony and 
the practices related with it.
Symphony in the service  
of secular power?
In today’s Russia, the division between religious and secular 
power remains unresolved due to the adaptation of the Byzantine 
ideal of symphonic power, which the Byzantologist H. G. Beck re-
ferred to as “political Orthodoxy”.29 By this coinage, Beck meant 
the Church’s dual role of temporal and ecclesiastical leadership. 
He also related it to the late nineteenth-century rediscovery of 
the Third Rome doctrine (i.e., the mythology of Moscow as a 
capital of Christendom after the Turks had invaded Constanti-
nople in 145330), to a hostile attitude towards Western Catholicism 
and later Protestantism that is still present today, to confusion 
regarding succession to the throne, and to wars and devastation. 
Throughout its history, in spite of cataclysms and corruption, 
Russian Orthodoxy has cherished and maintained the ideal of 
symphony. Symphony and sobornost as closely linked concepts 
involve, according to the religious philosopher Nikolai Lossky 
(1870–1965), “combination of freedom and unity of many persons 
on the basis of their common love for the same absolute values”.31 
According to A. Verkhovskii, the Moscow Patriarchate today can 
be considered a political party although it is not formally regis-
tered as such.32
In political and secular rhetoric, loyalty to the values of Or-
thodox symphony (especially cherished by Slavophiles) has 
often been presented as an antithesis to Western individualism, 
pluralism, and democracy. In aggravating circumstances of 
war or power struggle, periods of disorder (smuta) and purges 
(chistka) of the ingroup, the Orthodox have tended to support 
the legitimacy of the secular regime. The ROC hierarchy backed 
the state with little reward in return, even during the worst years 
of Stalinist terror. Today, I see no other explanation for the im-
mense popularity of the cult of the Blessed Matrona of Moscow 
except that she is seen as the paragon of loyalty to Stalin, and by 
extension to the nation, when the Nazis were in the suburbs and 
attacking Moscow in late autumn of 1941.
Extremely useful for understanding the Russian version of 
civil religion and cultural patterns is the famous propagandistic 
book The truth about Religion in Russia (Pravda o religii v Rossii), 
published in 1942 by the Moscow Patriarchate to win the support 
of the allied powers by reassuring them that the Soviet govern-
ment does not persecute the faithful. The book bears witness to 
the patriotism of the ROC hierarchs led by locum tenens Metro-
politan Sergius (Stragorodskii). Although obviously propagandis-
tic and denying many facts, the pastoral speeches reveal an un-
questioned bond between the Russian nation and its Church and 
a willingness to sacrifice, and the authors declare that the only 
hope of defeating the enemy is by turning once more to God and 
His help. Importantly, as Pospielovsky points out, notwithstand-
ing the apocalypse of 1942, Pravda o religii also contains wording 
condemning war in a true Christian spirit.33
TO EMPHASIZE THE UNBREAKABLE bond between secular and reli-
gious authority, the sermons quoted in Pravda o religii draw an 
explicit parallel between the German invasion and the Teutonic 
knights’ attack of 1242, which Prince Alexander Nevskii repelled. 
Hitler’s attack is presented as analogous to the medieval one: 
again, seven hundred years later, the faithful are requested to 
collect money to save the homeland by supporting the Red Army. 
The manifestation of symphony and unquestioned loyalty to 
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the state authority is strongly implied in a photograph in which 
Metropolitan Sergii is sitting by his typewriter in a posture similar 
to Stalin with no visible pastoral or religious markers except a 
humble clerical black cap, the skufia, on his head.34 This example 
testifies to situations of extreme external danger which compels 
religious and secular leaders to unite, bring the contract between 
state and church under reconsideration, and invite the perse-
cuted ingroup back into the collective. The epigraph of Pravda 
o religii is from the Old Testament Book of Ezra: “Truth is great 
and will prevail”35. The reference to Ezra as a model — negotiating 
with the king, leading a group of exiles from Babylon back to their 
native Jerusalem, but also enforcing observance of the Torah and 
cleansing the community of inter-ethnic marriages — may per-
haps be seen as a vignette of Sergius and his behavior at that time. 
A similar but secular version of the motto is on the Red Army’s 
1945 victory medal: “Our cause is just — victory is ours”, and was 
preceded in the future tense by Molotov’s radio speech of June 
22, 1941: “Our cause is just, the enemy will be defeated, the vic-
tory will be ours”. The analogy between the religious and secular 
leaders’ mottos consolidates the idea of symphony: side by side 
they use, if needed, repressive means within their ingroup as a 
model of collective penance and redemption. Up until 1948, Sta-
lin used the church as his ally in international politics; in periods 
of détente, the ROC actively and systematically supported Soviet 
proposals in international peace organizations.
WHEN THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY and ideology eroded and lost 
their legitimacy, Orthodox institutions gradually replaced them 
as definers of the soft power agenda. Important milestones in-
cluded the millennial celebration of Russia’s baptism in 1988 and 
the canonization of thousands of new martyrs, most notably that 
of Tsar Nicholas in 2000.36 These events attest to a return of sym-
phony between state and church. Although the Social Doctrine37 
claimed a commitment to a separation of church and state, seen 
from today’s perspective, the Doctrine has not uprooted the sym-
phonic tradition and the informal practices related to it.
Consequently, a closer analysis of symphony and the related 
practices is needed for a better understanding of religion in con-
temporary Russia. However, the Russian sociologist Oleg Khark-
hordin has recently contributed to the analysis of cultural prac-
tices in several of his works.38 In the next section, I will address 
some of his remarks on concepts such as deification (theosis), col-
lective, circular control, self-exposure, and friendship — all of which 
are relevant in understanding Russian tradition and practices.
Civil society and  
congregational traditions
The idea of civil religion was popularized in the Russian context 
by Oleg Kharkhordin. In “Civil Society and Orthodox Christian-
ity”, Kharkhordin applies theories of civil society to diverging 
visions of Christian ethical life. He suggests that there exists a 
specific Russian conception of civil society in which the relations 
between civil life and religious traditions are negotiated in a man-
ner different to those of Protestant and Catholic communities 
and their perceptions of the ethical role of a congregation.39
Kharkhordin refers to Dostoevsky’s Slavophile concept of the 
theocratic mission of the Orthodox Church. It is best manifested 
in the famous episode in which Ivan Karamazov suggests that 
ecclesiastical courts should regulate all aspects of secular life too, 
so that the Christian church would finally fulfill its mission in this 
world. Ivan stresses that the Church should not try to take on 
the state functions of suppressing crime and sustaining political 
life — as Catholicism allegedly yearns to do. The church should 
not punish; it should not become the state, but all social relations 
should be recast in accordance with the New Testament.40
From the point of view of the characters in the Dosto-
evsky novel, this Orthodox vision still reflects the true, 
“right” (the meaning of “orthos” in Greek) project of 
the Christian church: not to coexist with the violent state 
as a necessary evil (a point on which both Catholics and 
Protestants seem to agree) but to strive with the radical 
denial of this evil through the deification of man (a famous 
Orthodox theosis) and through the reconstruction of the 
world on church principles.41
Indeed, deification, theosis, originally equivalent to imitatio Dei, 
is of major importance in Orthodox dogma and the practice of 
working on oneself (podvizat’sia). Kharkhordin convincingly 
adopts theosis as his starting point in translating cultural tradi-
tions from one regime to another. The radical denial of evil is 
related to the ideal of utmost humility, which stems from Jesus’ 
teaching in Matthew 18:15–17:
[I]f thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell 
him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall 
hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not 
hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in 
the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be 
established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it 
unto the church: but if he neglect to hear the church, let 
him be unto thee as a heathen man and a publican.
The three-step pattern of ingroup control is crucial: it stands as 
a model for religious and secular congregations and collectives. 
As suggested by Nikolai Berdiaev42 and Elizaveta Skobtsova,43 the 
Russian Revolutionary radicals indeed tried to translate Dosto-
evsky’s project into reality. Berdiaev famously called it “religious 
asceticism turned inside out”. Kharkhordin goes even further: 
in his discussion, all Soviet groups and collectives, from workers 
on a given factory shop floor to group of inmates in a given cell or 
tourists in a given hotel, “were all supposed to be transformed to 
become a ‘collective’”.44
The concept of “collective” turned out to be very stable. Ac-
cording to Kharkhordin, the secret of this stability and of the 
limited use of physical violence in normal Soviet life consisted in 
the fact that each Soviet collective functioned as a quasi-religious 
congregation, employing the principles of the New Testament to 
maintain the powerful system of circular social control within the 
collective.45
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Circular social interdependence and control, or krugovaia 
poruka, is another specifically deep-rooted tradition, stemming 
from the pre-modern peasant community in which the collective 
was supposed to bear responsibility for each member’s obliga-
tions and vice versa. Thus, both circular control in accordance 
with the Gospel and congregational norms underlay the surveil-
lance and the punitive system of the Soviet collectives. They also 
constituted the basis of Anton Makarenko’s pedagogical system 
targeted at educating the new soviet man, Homo Sovieticus.46
IN THE FIRST STAGE of the formation of the collective, the group 
was picked from more or less randomly assembled individuals 
who then were introduced to a goal and collective responsibil-
ity in attaining it. The second stage was to create a core (aktiv) 
within the group or collective who were responsible for ingroup 
surveillance and the regulation of behavior in accordance with 
set norms. In the third stage, the aktiv was subjected to the same 
norms as the rest so that the group became self-regulating. When 
circular control works, it is in a sense equivalent to a pseudo-
religious congregation, and in its essence, the secret of its success 
consisted in its stability and its limited use of violence. Kharkhor-
din’s conclusion is plausible that the structures of circular control 
in the Christian congregation and in the secular Soviet collective, 
two seemingly opposed phenomena, indeed coincided.47 Per-
haps these coincidences are not sporadic, but rather paradigmat-
ically related to the holistic Orthodox understanding of Christian 
individual efforts at deification and Christianity’s long teaching 
on communal (cenobitic) forms. Indeed, this unbroken chain 
does come to mind, given the popularity of reprints (and web 
versions) of old patristic, hagiographic, and pseudohagiographic 
literature devoted to ascetic and cenobitic life today. In short, 
krugovaia poruka and reliance on face-to-face relations help to 
explain how people cope with hardships. When salaries or pen-
sions were suspended for several months, as was often the case 
in the 1990s, it did not lead to massive unrest or violence. Today, 
circular responsibility might entail hosting refugees in private 
homes or Orthodox monasteries instead of state-run asylums.
Another focal component of congregational and pseudocon-
gregational practice is self-exposure, or oblichenie. In premodern 
times, the mystery of confession used to be public: the penitent 
confessed his or her sins in front of the priest-confessor and the 
congregation. Even later, when the mystery of confession took 
place in private, penance could not always be kept private. For 
example, if the penitent had committed grievous sins, he or she 
might not be allowed to enter the church, but have to stand out-
side.
In the Soviet Union, self-exposure became a part of purge 
procedures. During the 1933 purge, 76% of all Communist Party 
members went through a ritual in which their party cards were 
taken away from them, but returned again after a session of “criti-
cism and self-criticism” — that is, pseudo-congregational confes-
sion — and their approval as good party members.48
In his anthology of essays on theory of practices, Kharkhordin 
once again emphasizes the role of voluntary self-exposure.49 
Contemplating the meaning of the practice, common among 
Russians, of sometimes disclosing themselves in front of people 
important to them, he claims that Soviet citizens had voluntarily 
(that is, as an exercise of deification) translated that practice from 
the official sphere of party purges into their private sphere, into 
the sphere of friendship (druzhba).50 Kharkhodin analyzes grades 
of closeness, from hetairos to philos (from partner to friend), 
from private friends to friends of God, from the Tsar’s adviser to 
trading partners and drinking buddies. He does so using research 
materials such as medieval sources, classical and Christian Ortho-
dox compilations, and excerpts from contemporary spoken and 
written language.
Kharkhordin argues that, in Russian cultural practice, friend-
ship between two individuals is only a recent and rare phenom-
enon. The network of friends is what rules: “The network func-
tions, not the friend”; “my friend is your friend”; “friends share 
everything” (“u druz’ei vse obshchee”). Likewise “I am successful 
to that extent I am included in a network of friends”,51 or “Better 
a hundred friends than a hundred rubles”. Today too, it is crucial 
to have the right mediators and the right space: once one has 
them, everything else will follow. The exchange of friendly favors 
and the “informal economy” have had an enormous impact on 
the daily lives of Russians and on the process of change of society 
as a whole.52 True Judeo-Christian, Russian Orthodox values lie in 
being included in the “involvement of the individual in collective 
life”.53
IN THE SECTION ABOVE, based on Kharkhordin’s analysis, I aimed 
to point out analogies between religious and secular communal-
ity based on informal practices of circular responsibility. Aware-
ness of Orthodoxy-based tradition also helps us understand 
Russian intellectuals’ attraction to revolution, including thinkers 
from Sergei Bulgakov to Nikolai Berdyaev and Pavel Florensky. 
In the search for freedom and the rejection of corruption, they 
stressed the radical denial of evil. Perhaps ideas of symphony 
also highlight why the communality of Russian Orthodox intel-
lectuals and political elites today has little to do with their formal 
attendance at worship, but explains messianic expansionism.
Concepts like deification (theosis), circular control (krugovaia 
poruka), self-exposure (oblichenie), and friendship (druzhba) 
denote a holistic universe of distinct cultural practices and indi-
vidual participation in communal life which have had a long and 
unique history on Russian soil. By way of conclusion, I would sug-
gest that these core concepts should be given greater consider-
ation in addressing the positive potential of civil religion, and es-
pecially in defining the traits that constitute its unique substance 
in the negotiation of relations of agency between church and 
state and between church and civil society in the contemporary 
Russian situation, as well as in examining the ROC’s contributions 
to interconfessional dialog.
To conceptualize the potential of civil religion, a detailed 
analysis of the relevant agencies — formal and informal, produc-
tive and counterproductive, including taboos — is required. In 
the Russian context, in which the whole project of modernization 
is often viewed with suspicion, no successful social concept and 
accompanying action program will be attained without taking 
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that context’s premises and its specific religious-cum-political-
cum-cultural practices in earnest. When Bellah reminds us of the 
American founding fathers’ vision, he emphasizes it was based 
on rejection of particularism; instead, it relied on a vision of the 
common good and an artist-people’s creative idea: “The civil 
religion proposal is to strive once again to incarnate that artist-
people’s creative idea”.54 Recalling the artist-people’s creative 
idea is, to some extent, parallel and compatible with the ideas of 
Russian fin-de-siècle philosophers’, such as Vladimir Solovyov. 
The creative idea is at the core of the civil religion proposal: it of-
fers a solution to national (and nationalist) lethargy by involving 
an acknowledgment of mystery, but it also rejects the legitima-
tion of state repression. ≈
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